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Abstract
& Humans are able to use nonverbal behavior to make fast,
reliable judgments of both emotional states and personality
traits. Whereas a sizeable body of research has identified
neural structures critical for emotion recognition, the neural
substrates of personality trait attribution have not been
explored in detail. In the present study, we investigated the
neural systems involved in emotion and personality trait
judgments. We used a type of visual stimulus that is known to
convey both emotion and personality information, namely,
point-light walkers. We compared the emotion and person-
ality trait judgments made by subjects with brain damage to
those made by neurologically normal subjects and then
conducted a lesion overlap analysis to identify neural regions
critical for these two tasks. Impairments on the two tasks
dissociated: Some subjects were impaired at emotion
recognition, but judged personality normally; other subjects
were impaired on the personality task, but normal at emotion
recognition. Moreover, these dissociations in performance
were associated with damage to specific neural regions: Right
somatosensory cortices were a primary focus of lesion overlap
in subjects impaired on the emotion task, whereas left frontal
opercular cortices were a primary focus of lesion overlap in
subjects impaired on the personality task. These findings
suggest that attributions of emotional states and personal-
ity traits are accomplished by partially dissociable neural
systems. &
INTRODUCTION
People are exceedingly adept at using subtle visual cues
to guide their social judgments of others. Even impov-
erished stimuli, such as static pictures of posed facial
expressions, or very brief ‘‘thin slices’’ of whole-body
movements (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992), elicit reliable
judgments of emotion, personality, or both from human
raters. Both emotion recognition (e.g., coming to the
knowledge that Person X feels sad) and trait attribution
(e.g., coming to believe that Person Y is trustworthy) de-
pend on serial processes: (1) perception of the stimuli,
(2) relating the observed behavior to prior knowledge
and expectancies about how the behavior relates to
various psychological states or traits, and thus (3) in-
ferring the state or trait (Adolphs, 2002; Macrae & Bo-
denhausen, 2000; Gilbert, 1998). Evidence suggests that
substantial components of these processes happen rap-
idly and relatively automatically, although more effort-
ful, conscious components certainly play a significant
role (e.g., the consideration of situational constraints in
trait attribution; (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fiske, 1993).
In our study, we asked subjects to make judgments
about emotional states and about personality traits,
from human body movement stimuli. We investigated
the neural substrates of these two types of social judg-
ments by examining which regions of brain damage
were associated with deficits in task performance in
each case.
Studies of the processes by which people infer emo-
tional states commonly use the word recognition. In
contrast, the processes by which people infer personal-
ity traits are commonly called attribution, which implies
a greater role for existing concepts and expectancies on
the part of the attributer (it is a matter of debate whether
personality traits, defined as enduring characteristics that
are predictive of behavior, in fact exist at all, e.g., Mischel
& Shoda, 1995; nonetheless, these are judgments that
people make readily). For the sake of simplicity, we will
use the term judgment for both processes.
Point-Light Walkers and Social Cognition
The ability to predict behavior from inferred mental
states and traits confers significant advantages on an
individual living in a social context. A major contribution
to this ability derives from the capacity to make quick
and accurate categorizations of the feelings and action
tendencies of other individuals based on their nonverbal
behavior. Often, one can perceive patterns of body
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motion posture, gait, and trajectory cues before other
visual cues such as facial expression are available. Thus,
it is not surprising that people can extract a consider-
able amount of information from body movement,
even given fairly impoverished cues. An experimentally
useful method of depicting body movements was dis-
covered by Johansson (1973), who attached small
‘‘point-lights’’ to the major joints of actors and filmed
them walking or running in a dark room. In static form,
they appear as a random series of dots; however, the
moving lights are immediately recognizable as human
motion (often called ‘‘biological motion’’). Johansson’s
point-light technique eliminates most morphological
cues while preserving the natural relative movements
of body parts.
Using point-light biological motion stimuli, research-
ers have shown that people recognize not just types of
locomotory movement from point-light stimuli, but also
gender (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977), identity of friends
(Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977), traits such as vulnerability
(Gunns, Johnston, & Hudson, 2002), and emotional
states (Makeig, 2001; Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin, &
Sanford, 2001; Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan,
1996). To portray emotional states, Dittrich et al. (1996)
used whole-body point-light displays of people dancing,
and Makeig (2001) constructed point-light displays from
whole bodies filmed in various types of movements. In
contrast, Pollick et al. (2001) recently showed that people
can recognize affective states even from point-light de-
pictions of arms engaging in simple actions such as
drinking and knocking. People’s ability to derive socially
relevant information from such impoverished cues is
striking: Body movement is clearly a useful source of
information about others’ states and traits.
There have been several recent studies examining
the neural substrates of biological motion perception
(see below). However, despite a recent surge of inter-
est in the neurobiology of emotion and social percep-
tion, few neurobiological studies have focused on
biological motion cues that convey emotion or person-
ality information.
Neural Structures Associated with Emotion
Recognition and Personality Trait Recognition
Several cortical and subcortical structures are critical
for the recognition of emotional states in others. The
amygdalar nuclei have been implicated in the recogni-
tion of facial expressions of emotion, most often fear, by
both lesion (Adolphs et al., 1999; Sprengelmeyer et al.,
1999; Calder, Young, Perrett, Hodges, & Etcoff, 1996;
Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Young
et al., 1995) and functional imaging studies (Whalen
et al., 1998; Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996).
Orbitofrontal cortices have also been implicated in facial
emotion recognition (Kawasaki et al., 2001; Vuilleumier,
Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Marinkovic, Trebon,
Chauvel, & Halgren, 2000; Dolan et al., 1996; Hornak,
Rolls, & Wade, 1996). In contrast, insular cortices have
been implicated in the recognition specifically of disgust
(Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000; Phillips
et al., 1998; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch, Eysel, & Przuntek,
1998). Damage to cortices in the right hemisphere
has been shown by several authors to result in impair-
ments recognizing emotional expressions (Borod et al.,
1998; Bowers, Bauer, Coslett, & Heilman, 1985; Benowitz
et al., 1983), and recent evidence from both functio-
nal neuroimaging (Winston, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2003)
and from lesion overlap studies (Adolphs, Damasio, &
Tranel, 2002; Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Dam-
asio, 2000) suggests that right-hemisphere somatosen-
sory cortices are especially important for emotion
recognition. These latter two studies also found de-
ficits consequent to frontal operculum damage in emo-
tion recognition from faces (Adolphs et al., 2000) and
from prosody (Adolphs et al., 2002); the frontal oper-
culum has also been implicated in facial emotion re-
cognition in a functional imaging study (Kesler-West
et al., 2001).
The connection between damage to the somatosen-
sory cortex or frontal opercular cortex and impaired
emotion recognition suggests a model of emotion rec-
ognition in which internally modeling the observed
action plays a significant role. A simulation mechanism
involving the frontal operculum has been proposed by
other authors to underlie not only imitation but also
social cognitive behaviors such as inference of intention
(Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998).
Adolphs et al. (2000, 2002) suggested that such simula-
tion processes may also underlie emotion recognition
and may involve right-hemisphere somatosensory corti-
ces in addition to frontal operculum.
In contrast to studies of the recognition of emotional
states, few studies have examined the neural substrates
underlying attribution of personality traits. Judgments of
trustworthiness based on photographs of faces have
been shown by both lesion (Adolphs, Tranel, & Dam-
asio, 1998) and functional imaging (Winston, Strange,
O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002) studies to involve the amyg-
dala. However, it is not known how subjects with
damage to other areas fare on this type of task, or
whether the judgment of other personality traits relies
on the amygdala or (not incompatibly) relies on simu-
lation-related cortices, such as premotor and somato-
sensory areas.
Recent imaging studies have found amygdala activa-
tion correlating with the engagement of negative racial
stereotypes (i.e., series of linked representations of
social knowledge; Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et al., 2000)
and ventromedial prefrontal cortices may be implicated
in implicit gender stereotyping (Milne & Grafman, 2001).
However, the social judgments involved in these studies
addressed gender and race stereotypes and not specific
personality traits such as extraversion or warmth, and
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thus it is difficult to apply these findings to the attribu-
tion of such traits.
Several studies have examined PET or fMRI activa-
tion to biological motion stimuli, implicating cortices
along the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) in
the perception of such stimuli (Grossman & Blake,
2002; Servos, Osu, Santi, & Kawato, 2002; Grezes
et al., 2001; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha, &
Belliveau, 2001; Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Gross-
man et al., 2000). Of all of the studies that examined
neural activations in humans viewing point-light dis-
plays of biological motion, only Bonda, Petrides, Ostry,
and Evans (1996) used stimuli that were intended to
convey emotional or social meaning. These authors con-
trasted the patterns of PET activation observed when
subjects watched expressive whole-body dancing move-
ments with those observed when subjects watched an
example of goal-directed movement, namely, a hand
picking up a glass and drinking. During viewing of ex-
pressive body movements, they observed more activity
in right STS and adjacent temporal cortex, as well as in
the amygdala.
In the present study, we showed point-light stimuli to
37 subjects with brain damage, as well as age-, gender-,
and education-matched neurologically normal control
subjects. All subjects completed emotion and personal-
ity judgment tasks, as well as a control task of simple
movement labeling. We conducted two kinds of analy-
ses: (1) a lesion overlap analysis of emotion and of
personality trait judgments, using the entire sample
of subjects and (2) an analysis specifically of those
subjects with damage in right somatosensory cortices.
These analyses permitted a detailed investigation of the
neural substrates necessary for emotion and personality
judgments, and of the possible reliance of these pro-
cesses on right somatosensory cortex, as implied by
earlier studies of face- and prosody-based emotion
tasks. Because another region, the left frontal opercu-
lum, was implicated in the personality task based on the
first analysis, we also specifically compared subjects
with left frontal opercular damage to normal controls
on this task.
RESULTS
Across the 37 brain-damaged subjects we tested, there
was a weak correlation between scores on the two social
judgment tasks (Pearson’s r = .45). However, it is not
this overall correlation that is of interest, but rather the
deviations from it. Whereas there are 5 subjects who
were impaired on both tasks, we found a double disso-
ciation across subjects: 7 were impaired on the emotion
task but not the personality task, and 4 were impaired
on the personality task but not on the emotion task. We
first discuss cortical regions associated with each social
judgment deficit, and then explore the dissociation with
further lesion overlap analyses.
Emotion Judgments
Thirteen of the total of 37 brain-damaged subjects we
tested were impaired at judging emotion from point-
light walkers (> 2 SDs below matched normal controls
[NCs]; this includes the 5 impaired on both tasks and
the 7 impaired only on the emotion task, as well as 1
who was impaired on the emotion task but gave an
invalid performance on the personality task; see Meth-
ods). We constructed a lesion overlap image by tracing
the lesions of all impaired subjects onto a common
reference brain (Figure 1) (Damasio, 2000). This re-
vealed an area of maximal overlap in right somatosen-
sory cortices. As can also be seen from this figure,
damage to multiple parts of the brain could result in
impairments in emotion recognition from point-light
walkers, consistent with a distributed system for emo-
tion recognition with multiple participating compo-
nents. However, the regions in which lesions were
most consistently associated with impairments in emo-
tion judgment were the right somatosensory cortices
(see also Table 1). To control for inhomogeneous
sampling of lesion locations throughout the brain, we
also calculated lesion overlaps that were normalized
relative to the total lesion sampling densities across
the brain (see Methods for details, and Figure 2 for
the total distribution of lesion sampling density). This
normalized calculation also showed a maximal lesion
overlap in right somatosensory cortices, confirming that
this lesion overlap could not be attributed solely to our
sampling of lesions.
There were no clear differences in the regions of
lesion overlap associated with impaired judgment of
specific individual emotions.
Personality Judgments
A different set of subjects, 9 in total, was impaired at
judging personality traits from point-light walkers (> 2
SDs below NC mean). Seven of these nine subjects had
damage on the left side, with a focus of maximal lesion
overlap in the left premotor areas, more specifically in
the posterior sector of the frontal operculum (Figure 3;
see also Table 1). We again recalculated these lesion
overlaps normalized relative to sampling densities across
the brain, and confirmed that the area of maximal lesion
overlap in left frontal opercular cortices did not result
from sampling bias.
There were no clear differences in the regions of
lesion overlap associated with impaired judgment of
specific individual personality traits.
Relationship between Emotion Recognition and
Personality Trait Recognition
A comparison of Figures 1 and 3 shows that impair-
ments on each task are associated with disproportionate
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damage to different brain regions. To explicitly ad-
dress the question of which cortical regions are more
critical for one task than the other, we compared
the lesion overlaps of subjects who performed relatively
worse on one task than on the other (see Methods
for details). Figure 4 (top) shows the lesion overlap
of eight subjects who were more impaired on the
emotion task than on the personality task. The region
of maximal overlap includes right somatosensory cor-
tices, particularly postcentral gyrus and insula. The bot-
tom half of Figure 4 shows the results for seven subjects
who performed worse on the personality task than on
the emotion task. These results, like those for all
subjects impaired on the personality task (Figure 3),
show a maximal overlap of lesions in left prefrontal
cortices.
Figure 1. Lesions that impair
recognition of emotion. Shown
are the overlaps of lesions
(color scale) from subjects who
were impaired at emotion
recognition from point-light
walkers (> 2 SDs below NC
mean). The greatest overlap
was in right somatosensory
regions. Normalization for
overall lesion sampling density
revealed a similar pattern (not
shown). Note that the right
sides of coronal images
correspond to the left side
of the brain.
Figure 2. Total lesion
sampling density. Shown are
the overlaps of the lesions
from all 37 subjects who
participated in the study.
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Table 1. Demographic and Neuropsychological Background Information for All 37 Brain-Damaged Subjects, as Well as Means of Demographic Information for Both the Matched
and Reference Normal Control (NC) Groups
WAIS Subtests
Subject
No.
Lesion
Location Sex Hand
Education
(years) Age
Time since
Lesion
Acquired Similarities Information Comprehension
Matrix
Reasoning
Faces
(Adj)
Lines
(Adj)
BVRT
CORR
BVRT
ERROR
Depression
Index
Aphasia
Index
Subjects impaired on emotion task (>2 SDs below normal control mean)
0650GR RSS M 90 10 58.75 15.5 9 6 9 7 45 26 9 2 0 0
0744ES RSS, STS M 100 8 83.6 15.5 14 16 13 11 43 30 7 4 0 0
1106MB bi OFC, RSS M 100 12 56.75 13.5 13 9 10 8 41 20 4 10 0 0
2107WM RSS M 100 12 60 4.5 11 11 11 9 42 22 5 8 0 0
1981RG R parietal M 100 16 68.5 6.75 13 12 12 13 50 29 8 3 0 0
1637CW RSTS (crossed) F 90 12 60.75 9 9 10 8 NA 43 26 7 5 0 1-crossed
1076GS L PFC M 100 18 77.25 13.5 NA NA NA 12 44 25 5 7 0 3
1366GG L STS M 100 15 73.6 12.5 14 13 NA NA 51 25 6 7 0 1
Subjects impaired on personality task (>2 SDs below normal control mean)
1760KS LFO M 100 12 50.25 11 NA NA NA 7 45 22 5 7 0 3
1772ST LFO F 100 12 75.75 8.5 13 8 12 10 47 26 6 9 2 0
1783AW LFO M 100 16 76.5 9 10 13 10 11 41 30 7 6 0 0
1033AN L STS M 100 8 37.5 14.75 5 5 6 14 43 25 10 0 0 0
Subjects impaired on both tasks (>2 SDs below normal control mean)
0770PK bi OFC F 100 16 58.75 15.25 12 16 12 13 34 21 9 1 0 0
1726RO LFO M 100 12 66 10.5 6 8 4 9 42 29 6 6 NA 2
1978JB LFO F 100 12 55 5.5 6 10 5 12 47 22 6 5 0 3
2394EH L STS M 50 16 48 2.5 NA NA NA 12 45 27 8 3 0 3
2126JC RSS F 100 14 56.25 10.25 15 14 10 10 40 21 5 8 0 0
Subjects who performed normally on both tasks (within 2 SDs of normal control mean)
1561RB R PFC M 60 16 60.25 10.5 15 13 16 13 43 29 8 4 0 0
1656GG R insula M 100 12 57.75 8.5 10 10 NA 11 43 25 7 4 2 0
1969CC RFO, insula M 100 12 60.25 6.25 10 12 12 8 44 29 5 9 1 0
0747RH RSS, STS M 100 14 51.75 10 9 15 12 10 41 23 9 1 0 0
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Table 1. (continued )
WAIS Subtests
Subject
No.
Lesion
Location Sex Hand
Education
(years) Age
Time since
Lesion
Acquired Similarities Information Comprehension
Matrix
Reasoning
Faces
(Adj)
Lines
(Adj)
BVRT
CORR
BVRT
ERROR
Depression
Index
Aphasia
Index
1711KK RSS F 100 13 38.75 10.5 7 8 6 7 39 15 7 5 1 0
2328JF RSS F 100 18 49.5 1.5 12 12 13 7 41 27 9 1 1 0
2025LB R OFC F 100 16 47.75 4.75 11 12 NA 13 50 NA 9 1 0 0
0318VM bi OFC M 100 14 60 24 18 16 19 14 43 30 9 1 0 0
1589RM bi OFC M 100 20 51 18.25 15 15 18 11 49 28 7 4 1 0
1983DR bi OFC F 100 13 38 5.5 12 9 15 10 41 24 8 3 NA 0
0297RF L OFC M 100 16 51.25 19.5 11 13 10 10 49 22 7 5 0 0
0468JG LFO M 100 16 75.5 18.5 14 14 9 13 50 30 9 1 0 0
0675ES L PFC F 100 12 73.75 12.5 12 12 10 12 48 26 8 4 NA 1
1649RD L PFC M 100 16 79.75 11 14 14 NA NA 47 30 6 6 0 0
1188NE L STS M 100 18 42.25 13.5 15 16 15 12 50 27 10 0 1 2
1848ML LSTS (w.m.) M 100 12 50 4 7 12 11 13 49 29 9 2 0 1
2435RR L sub-STS M 100 12 57.75 1.5 NA 12 NA 10 50 NA 8 2 0 2
1621LL L temp/par F 100 9 68 9.25 11 7 10 13 46 21 7 4 0 1
0858JM bi occipital M 100 16 52.5 15 11 11 15 11 NA NA 7 3 NA NA
0999JLK L occipital M 100 16 46.5 6.5 13 13 15 8 45 28 9 1 0 0
BD mean (SD) 11 F, 26 M 13.8 (2.9) 57.5 (11.9) 10.5 (5.2) 11.3 (3.1) 11.5 (2.9) 11.4 (3.7) 10.8 (2.1) 44.5 (4.0) 25.4 (3.6) 7.4 (1.6) 4.1 (2.8)
Matched NC
mean (SD)
6 F, 12 M 14.6 (2.6) 57.4 (13.4) – 11.7 (3.2) 11.7 (3.7) 12.2 (2.4) 12 (3.6) – – – – – –
Ref NC mean (SD) 25 F, 16 M 15.1 (2.4) 47.8 (14.3) – 12.7 (2.5) 12.5 (3.1) 13.7 (2.4) 13.9 (2.3) – – – – – –
Brain-damaged subjects are split into groups as follows: those impaired on the emotion recognition task only; those impaired on the personality recognition task only; those impaired on both tasks; and
those not impaired on either task. Lesion locations are abbreviated as follows: L/R = left and right sides; bi = bilateral; mes = mesial; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; PFC = prefrontal cortex; STS = superior
temporal sulcus; FO = frontal operculum.
The following psychological and neuropsychological test scores are presented: Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS): four subtests (Similarities, Information, Comprehension, and Matrix Reasoning),
obtained from the WAIS-R or WAIS-III; the Benton Facial Discrimination Task (FACES); the Benton Judgment of Line Orientation Task (LINES); Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT), number correct
(CORR) and number of errors (ERROR).
In addition, data from a depression index and an aphasia index are shown. A clinical neuropsychologist blind to subjects’ performance on the experimental tasks assigned ratings on a 4-point scale,
ranging from 0 (no depression) to 1 (mild depression), 2 (moderate depression), and 3 (severe depression). These ratings were based on data from the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1987) and the
MMPI (or MMPI-2), Scale 2 (Butcher et al., 1989).
Similarly, on the basis of the Multilingual Aphasia Examination (Benton & Hamsher, 1989) and the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (Goodglass & Kaplan, 1983), administered in the chronic epoch,
and on observations recorded in the neuropsychological reports, a neuropsychologist blind to subjects’ performance on the experimental tasks rated each subject on a scale from 0 (normal) to 3 (severe
impairment) in terms of speech and language functioning. These scores thus represent summary measures of the overall degree of speech/language impairment in each subject.)
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Importance of Right Somatosensory Cortices for
Emotion Recognition from Point-Light Walkers
Because right somatosensory cortices have been impli-
cated in emotion recognition from other types of cues
in previous studies (cf. Introduction), we specifically
examined the emotion task performance of all 8 subjects
whose lesions included the right postcentral gyrus.
Five of these 8 subjects scored more than 2 SDs below
the NC mean on the emotion recognition task, and 1
Figure 3. Lesions that impair
recognition of personality
traits. Shown are the overlaps
of lesions from subjects who
were impaired at personality
trait recognition from
point-light walkers (> 2 SDs
below NC mean). The greatest
overlap was in left opercular
regions. Normalization for
overall lesion sampling density
revealed a similar pattern
(not shown).
Figure 4. Recognition of
emotion or personality
depends on dissociable neural
regions. We selected subjects
who performed worse on one
task than on the other (see
Methods). Top, subjects who
were impaired on the emotion
task, but less impaired on the
personality task. Note overlap
in right somatosensory regions.
Bottom, subjects who were
impaired on the personality
task, but less impaired on the
emotion task. Note overlap in
left premotor regions.
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scored between 1 and 2 SDs below the NC mean. The
other two subjects with right somatosensory cortex
damage scored normally on this task. As a group, these
8 subjects’ emotion correctness scores are significantly
below those of a group of 18 matched NC subjects
(Mann–Whitney U test, p < .0005).
Importance of Left Frontal Opercular Cortices for
Personality Judgments From Point-Light Walkers
Although we did not predict that damage to the left
frontal operculum would result in deficits in personality
trait judgments (and not emotion judgments), the
lesion overlap analyses described above implicated the
left frontal operculum in personality judgments. To
follow up this result, we performed a similar analysis
comparing all 7 subjects with left frontal opercular
damage to the 18 matched NC subjects on the person-
ality task. Of these 7, 5 were more than 2 SDs below the
NC mean on this task, and one was 1 SD below the
mean. As a group, these 7 subjects’ personality task
scores are significantly below that of the 18 matched NC
subjects (Mann–Whitney U test, p < .005).
Relationship of Movement Labeling Control Task
to Emotions and Personality Tasks
To control for deficits in recognition of ‘‘nonsocial’’ (i.e.,
not emotion or personality) information from point-
light walkers, we examined the relationship of subjects’
ability to label the forms of locomotion exhibited by the
walkers (walking, running, and so forth) with their
ability to judge emotions and personality traits from
the same stimuli. Six subjects were impaired (> 2 SDs
below the NC mean) at labeling the form of locomotion
depicted by point-light walkers, but no clear region of
overlap was associated with this deficit. We examined
the relationship between performance on this move-
ment labeling task to performance on the two social
judgment tasks. Four of the six subjects impaired on the
movement task are also 2 SDs below the NC mean on
both the emotion and the personality tasks; one is
impaired at this level on just the personality task
(though is 1 SD below the mean on the emotion task),
and one is just 1 SD below the mean on both tasks.
Conversely, four of the five subjects who were 2 SDs
below the NC mean on both the emotion task and the
personality task were impaired on the movement
labeling task as well. However, there were clear deficits
on either one of the social judgment tasks individually
that occurred in the absence of deficits recognizing the
movements: Of the seven subjects who are impaired
on the emotion task but not on the personality task,
none are impaired on the movement labeling task. Of
the four subjects who are impaired on the personality
task but not on the movement task, only one is
impaired on the movement task. Thus, whereas im-
paired nonsocial movement recognition invariably re-
sulted in at least mild impairments in emotion and
personality judgments, the latter impairments could
occur without an impairment in nonsocial movement
recognition and labeling. We return to this issue in
the Discussion.
Control Measures: Demographic Variables,
Neuropsychological Tests, and Visual Perception
To assess whether differences in age, education level,
basic verbal skills/IQ, or basic visuoperceptual function-
ing underlay the above findings, these data were com-
pared for the groups of brain-damaged subjects who
performed best and worst, respectively, on the two
social judgment point-light walker tasks. Thus, we com-
pared the 15 subjects with the best emotion judgment
scores to the 15 subjects with the worst emotion judg-
ment scores, on several neuropsychological measures
(see Methods) via two-sample t tests. The subjects with
the worst emotion judgment scores had significantly
lower mean scores on two tests of visuoperceptual
ability: The Benton Line Orientation task ( p < .05)
and Benton Visual Retention Task (BVRT; number cor-
rect; p < .005); there were no significant differences on
any other neuropsychological measures. We also com-
pared these same demographic and neuropsychological
measures for the 15 subjects with the best and worst
personality judgment scores. These two groups differed
significantly on three measures, the verbal IQ subtests
( p < .05), the Benton Faces task ( p < .05) and the
Benton Lines task ( p < .05).
To ensure that visuospatial deficits could not fully
account for deficits in either the emotion judgment
task or the personality judgment task, we performed
regression analyses of emotion and personality judg-
ment task scores separately for each of the three
visuospatial neuropsychological tests implicated in
the above analyses (BVRT, the Benton Lines Task,
and the Benton Faces Task). We used the regression
results in two ways. First, r2 values were fairly low
for each of these analyses (emotion task: with BVRT,
r2 = .189; with lines, r2 = .032; with faces, r2 = .103;
personality task: with BVRT, r2 = .075; with lines,
r2 = .041; with faces, r2 = .104). Thus, much of the
variance in brain-damaged subjects’ task performance
was not accounted for by their visuospatial neuropsy-
chological test performance. Second, we compared the
residuals from each of these regressions for the 15
worst and 15 best emotion task scorers for whom we
had neuropsychological data. We did the same com-
parisons for the 15 worst and 15 best personality task
scorers. In all six of these comparisons, t tests con-
firmed that the residuals were significantly different for
the high versus low scorers on the social judgment
tasks (all ps  .01).
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DISCUSSION
Relationship between Emotion Recognition and
Personality Trait Recognition
Thirteen brain-damaged subjects were impaired at mak-
ing emotion judgments from point-light walkers, relative
to a group of matched normal controls. A partially
overlapping group of 9 brain-damaged subjects was
impaired at a different social judgment task, judging
personality traits, from an overlapping set of point-light
stimuli. Not surprisingly, performance on these tasks
was weakly correlated; nonspecific deficits after brain
damage can lead to overall poorer performance across
tasks. What is striking is that deviations from the corre-
lation occurred in both directions: Extending the logic of
a two-case double dissociation to group analyses, we
found that groups of subjects were impaired on each
task in the absence of impairments on the other task.
Seven subjects were impaired on the emotion task but
not the personality task, and 4 were impaired on the
personality task but not the emotion task. A double
dissociation does not imply that two processes are al-
ways separate, but that they can be separated; thus, the
process of judging that a point-light walker is in a
certain emotional state is separable from judging that a
point-light walker is a certain kind of person, and vice
versa.
Impairments in judging emotions from point-light
walkers were associated with damage to several compo-
nents of a network of neural structures, with the most
reliable region of lesion overlap associated with this
impairment in right somatosensory cortices. This region
was a consistent focus of maximal lesion overlap in three
overlap analyses: All subjects impaired in emotion judg-
ments; the same overlap normalized for sampling den-
sity; and subjects who showed a greater impairment in
judging emotion than in judging personality traits. In
contrast, impairments in judging personality traits from
point-light walkers were associated with damage to the
left frontal operculum, which was a consistent focus of
maximal lesion overlap in three overlap analyses: all
subjects impaired in personality trait judgment, the
same overlap normalized for sampling density, and
subjects who showed a greater impairment in judging
personality than in judging emotion.
These two tasks differ in more than one way, and it is
important to be aware of differences between the tasks
that may explain at least part of the difference in lesion
overlap. One possibility is that the words used in one
task are more difficult than those used in the other.
However, this explanation could only result in a single
dissociation, not the double dissociation we in fact
observed. It remains possible that one aspect of our
findings, namely, impaired judgment of personality traits
following damage to what are classically thought of as
language-related regions in the left hemisphere, might
be attributable to differences in the difficulty of the
words used. Although frequency of word use is only
one measure of word ‘‘difficulty,’’ a comparison of the
incidence of the 5 emotion words and the 10 personality
words we used shows that all 5 emotion words occur in
the top 5000 most commonly used North American
English words, according to the Brown Corpus, an
index of word use (lists available at www.edict.com.hk/
lexiconindex/ ). In contrast, whereas 3 of the personality
trait words were also in the top 5000 list, the others are
not. Thus, it is possible that subjects who performed
poorly on the personality task did so because of diffi-
culties in mapping the personality terms appropriately
onto their associated concepts. This possibility is sup-
ported by significantly lower scores on a verbal IQ
measure for those subjects who performed poorly on
the personality task, relative to subjects who performed
well. However, it is also worth noting that the aphasia
index did not differ between these two groups: Some
aphasic individuals performed poorly, but some per-
formed normally, and there were a number of subjects
who performed very poorly but were not aphasic (see
Table 1). Thus, it does not appear that language differ-
ences between the tasks can completely account for the
dissociation we observed.
Another difference between the emotion task and the
personality task is that the emotion task is a five-alter-
native forced-choice task, and the personality task is a
rating task. Rating each point-light walker stimulus on a
scale between, for example, friendly and unfriendly may
engage different processes than choosing the most
applicable from a list of emotion words. To address this
issue, we compared the groups of subjects who were
impaired on either of the two social judgment tasks on
two measures directly comparable to these tasks in
terms of format: a face emotion rating task (Adolphs
et al., 2000) and a forced-choice face matching task
(Benton, Sivan, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994). In
the face emotion rating task, subjects rate each face on
Likert scales; on the face matching task, subjects choose
from a series of photos one that is of the same individ-
ual as a target photo. The group of subjects impaired on
the point-light emotion task did not differ on either
measure from the group of subjects impaired on the
point-light personality task. This finding implies that the
task format alone (forced choice in one case, and Likert-
scale rating in another case) is not sufficient to explain
the findings of the current study. However, it will be
important in future work to replicate our results with
identical formats.
A third difference between the emotion task and the
personality task is that, as noted in the Introduction,
deciding whether someone’s behavior is indicative of a
personality trait may rely more heavily on prior knowl-
edge than deciding whether a similar behavior is indic-
ative of an emotional state. If, as many theorists have
argued, personality traits are in fact stable over extended
periods of time, then it may be harder to judge what
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someone would behave like if one were a certain kind
of person; one has experienced only one’s own traits
from the inside. In contrast, any given person knows
what it feels like to experience all of the basic emotions,
and thus it may be easier to know what someone would
behave like if he/she were in a certain emotional state.
This difference suggests that the differential involvement
of cortical regions in trait versus state judgments may be
due to differences in the extent to which prior knowl-
edge is necessary to make these two types of judgments;
further research is necessary to explore this possibility.
Similar experiments with face stimuli would provide
needed converging evidence.
The neuropsychological comparisons bear further
discussion. As noted above, subjects who performed
poorly on the personality task scored significantly lower
than nonimpaired subjects on a verbal IQ measure, and
thus verbal deficits may explain at least part of their
impairment on the personality task. These impaired
subjects also scored lower on two tests of visuospatial
functioning, the Benton Face Matching Task and the
Benton Line Orientation Task. Not surprisingly, poor
visuospatial function may thus account for poor perfor-
mance on either the emotion task or the personality
task. However, visuospatial perception abilities are not
more important for emotion judgments from point-light
walkers than for personality judgments from the same
stimuli, and thus these findings cannot explain the
double dissociation we observed. Furthermore, we
found that the residuals from regressions between vi-
suospatial perception tasks and the target social judg-
ment tasks were significantly different for low versus
high scorers on the social judgment tasks. This result
confirms that the social judgment tasks were tapping
something other than basic visuospatial ability: Subjects
differed on these tasks in ways not accounted for by
their basic visuospatial test scores.
The Relation between Labeling Movements from
Point-Light Walkers and Labeling Emotion and
Personality from the Same Stimuli: The Role
of Simulation
Our control task deserves a brief further discussion. We
chose to use the same point-light stimuli in our control
as in our target tasks in an effort to control as well as
possible for all the visual properties of the stimuli. The
ability to label the form of locomotory movement de-
picted by a point-light walker includes both a perceptual
and a labeling component. This ability appears to be
necessary but not sufficient for emotion labeling. All of
the subjects who were impaired at labeling the point-
light walkers’ movements were at least mildly impaired
on both the emotion task and the personality task.
However, there were several subjects who were im-
paired on one or the other social task but not on the
movement task. It is also worth noting that of the five
subjects who were impaired on both social tasks four
were also impaired on the movement task. These results
imply that failure to recognize and label the point-light
walker’s movements may underlie deficits in social judg-
ments, but deficits in social judgments cannot be ex-
plained only by failure to adequately recognize the
motion stimulus. It should be noted, however, that in
those cases where subjects were impaired on the target
task(s) as well as the control task, we cannot distinguish
between at least two different possibilities: (1) They are
impaired because they fail to perceive the stimulus
normally or (2) they are impaired because of a broader,
nonperceptual impairment that encompasses our exper-
imental task as well as such tasks as action naming and
verb generation (required in our control task). Possibil-
ity (2) bears further explanation, as there is some
evidence that one of the regions found critical for
personality trait recognition in our present study (the
left frontal operculum) is important also in action nam-
ing and verb-generation tasks (Tranel, Kemmerer, Dam-
asio, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2003; Cappa, Sandrini,
Rossini, Sosta, & Miniussi, 2002; Damasio et al., 2001;
Tranel, Adolphs, Damasio, & Damasio, 2001; Herholz
et al., 1996; Daniele, Giustolisi, Silveri, Colosimo, &
Gainotti, 1994; Damasio & Tranel, 1993). When we
examined the lesion overlap of subjects who showed
impairment on the control task of labeling point-light
walkers’ movements, we did not find a corresponding
area of maximal lesion overlap. Although we might
expect a region of overlap in the left frontal opercular
cortices based on the above studies, our control task was
not designed to address this issue. Rather, its purpose
was to rule out deficits in social judgment tasks that are
due to less specific deficits in recognizing locomotory
movements from point-light walker stimuli. Our failure
to find an overlap in subjects who were impaired at
labeling locomotory movement patterns in point-light
walkers indicates that possibility (1) above is more likely:
These subjects are impaired on both the control task
and at assigning social meaning to the locomotory
patterns due to nonspecific perceptual impairments
and not to a single underlying process. This confirms
the validity of using the movement-labeling task as a
control task.
The co-occurrence of impairments in recognizing
forms of locomotory movement and recognizing emo-
tions from these movements dovetails nicely with the
simulation theory of emotion recognition. Deficits in
modeling another person’s movements in one’s own
premotor cortex, somatosensory cortex, or both might
lead to impairments in both tasks. However, it is
conceivable that someone could recognize movements
normally but still not be able to model what it ‘‘feels
like’’ to move in a given way. Thus, internal simulation
of movements may be a necessary but not sufficient
component of a more complete simulation of move-
ment with emotional state markers. Several researchers
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have postulated that simulation processes underlie our
ability to infer intentions from movement, including
from point-light walkers (see Blakemore & Decety,
2001; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In simulation theories,
‘‘mirror neurons’’ in the frontal operculum, possibly
primarily on the left, are thought to be engaged in
creating a representation of actions whether observed
or performed by the subject. Frontal opercular cortices
have been shown to be active when subjects judged
emotional facial expressions (Kesler-West et al., 2001).
Furthermore, as noted above, Adolphs et al. (2000,
2002) have found deficits in emotion recognition from
faces and from prosody after damage to either the
frontal operculum or right somatosensory cortices.
Somatosensory cortices may function in simulation
processes of emotion recognition by creating a repre-
sentation of the feeling associated with a given emo-
tional behavior (Adolphs, 2002). Interestingly, Winston
et al. (2003) showed that right somatosensory cortices
are engaged during an emotion recognition task, but
not during ‘‘incidental’’ emotion processing when the
same faces are viewed as part of a gender recognition
task. In summary, when explicitly attributing emotional
states based on observations of behavior (visual or
auditory), we may use internal models of the move-
ments that correspond with the observed behavior to
generate a representation of what it would feel like to
look (or sound) like the person we observe.
Given the above model of emotion recognition via
simulation, it is not surprising that right somatosensory
cortices and the left frontal operculum both play roles
in recognizing social information from point-light
walkers. However, it is more difficult to explain the
particular dissociation that we observed. People may
use simulation processes differently when inferring
that a person moving in a certain way feels a given
emotion (a state judgment) as compared to drawing
inferences from the same information about a person’s
general pattern of behavior (a trait judgment). This
possibility is fascinating, and further work is necessary
to address (1) whether the same dissociation is found
when subjects are making similar judgments from
other types of cues (e.g., faces, verbal descriptions of
behavior) and (2) whether the anatomical areas shown
here to be relevant for emotion and personality trait
judgments from point-light walkers will also turn out
to be engaged in functional imaging studies in which
these tasks are performed by neurologically normal
subjects.
METHODS
Subjects
Normal Controls
We tested 62 neurologically normal controls between
the ages of 29 and 87. Of these, three were excluded
from all analyses due to one of the following exclusion-
ary criteria: significant vision problems (1), experimenter
error (1), being an outlier on all tasks (1). The 59
remaining normal controls were divided into two sub-
groups as follows. The comparison group, or matched
NC group, consisted of 18 subjects (6 women, 12 men)
matched to the target subjects with respect to age,
gender ratio, and approximate educational level (see
Table 1 for demographic and IQ information). The
remaining 41 subjects comprised the reference NC
group, whose ratings of stimuli were used solely as a
reference to assign ‘‘correctness’’ scores (see Table 1 for
demographic and IQ information).
Brain-damaged Subjects
We tested 37 subjects with adult-acquired damage that
included cortical regions. All subjects’ lesions were due
to stroke or to surgery, and none had a history of
epilepsy. The extent of subjects’ lesions was variable,
and included cortices (and underlying white matter) in
the frontal, temporal, parietal, and, to a lesser extent,
occipital lobes. Subjects’ lesions had been mapped onto
a common reference brain, allowing visualization of the
extent of lesion overlap (Figure 2).
All brain-damaged participants were selected from
the Patient Registry of the Division of Cognitive Neuro-
science, Department of Neurology, University of Iowa,
and had been fully characterized neuropsychologically
(Tranel, 1996) and neuroanatomically (Damasio, 2000;
Frank, Damasio, & Grabowski, 1997). Our exclusion
criterion was impairment in basic visual perception,
attention, or any other abilities that was sufficiently
severe that they would affect subjects’ ability to give a
valid performance on the target tasks, as judged by a
clinical neuropsychologist who had been shown the
tasks but had no other knowledge of the study hy-
potheses. All subjects were thought to be able to give
valid performance except one who, due to aphasia, was
thought to be potentially impaired, but equally for both
tasks. All participants also conformed to the inclusion
criteria of the Patient Registry: They had focal, chronic,
stable, adult-acquired lesions that could be clearly
identified on MR or CT scans. Note that this excluded
the following: Subjects with metal clips whose lesions
could not be clearly delineated due to imaging artifacts
(i.e., many subjects with damage due to surgeries),
subjects with lesions acquired developmentally, and
subjects with encephalitis that resulted in lesions with
unclear boundaries. All participants had IQs in the
normal range, and none were demented. The subjects
were studied in the chronic epoch, that is, more than
3 months after lesion onset (see Table 1 for demo-
graphic and neuropsychological information for all
brain-damaged subjects). All subjects gave informed
consent, as approved by the University of Iowa Institu-
tional Review Board.
Heberlein et al. 1153
Stimuli and Tasks
Construction of Point-Light Stimuli
Twelve small lights were attached to the major joints and
the head of a male actor. He was filmed portraying
specific emotions and personality traits while moving
in a dark room. We did not take into account the actor’s
intention in determining what emotion category or
personality trait was ‘‘correct’’ for a given stimulus. All
correctness scores were based on the answers given by
the reference group of normal controls (see below).
Pilot testing enabled us to eliminate the stimuli that
elicited the most variable judgments, yielding sets of 33
simple emotion movies and 41 personality trait movies.
These sets overlapped: 29 movies were common to both
sets, with 4 additional movies in the emotion set and 12
in the personality set. We constructed an additional set
of 9 movies chosen from the sets of emotion and
personality movies for use in a control task in which
subjects identified various types of movement (e.g.,
walking, creeping, and marching). Stimuli were pre-
sented in a fixed random order and varied in length from
3 to 55 sec [emotion set: mean 8.5 (SD 6.2); personality
set: 8.9 (6.0); movement set: 8.7 (6.7)]. (Examples can be
viewed at www.medicine.uiowa.edu/adolphs.)
Stimuli were presented on a Macintosh G-3 Power-
book, with subjects seated approximately 60 cm from
the display. Subjects responded verbally or by pointing
to items on the response sheet in front of them.
Reaction time was not measured, and subjects were
not pressed to respond quickly.
Emotion Judgment
For the emotion stimulus set, subjects were instructed
to pick the word that best described the movement from
a list of five words (happy, sad, angry, afraid, and
neutral). These emotions were chosen from the set of
‘‘basic emotions’’ (Ekman & Friesen, 1971); ‘‘disgust’’
and ‘‘surprise’’ were excluded from the stimulus set
because it was felt that these emotions could not be
clearly conveyed with body movement. The list of
emotion words was visible in front of the subject for
the duration of testing.
Personality Trait Judgment
For the personality trait stimulus set, subjects rated each
stimulus on five 5-point Likert scales, each of which was
anchored by a pair of antonyms defining a personality
factor (Extraversion: ‘‘Outgoing’’ and ‘‘Shy’’; Warmth:
‘‘Friendly’’ and ‘‘Unfriendly’’; Reliability: ‘‘Trustworthy’’
and ‘‘Not trustworthy’’; Neuroticism: ‘‘Calm’’ and ‘‘Anx-
ious’’; Novelty preference: ‘‘Stay-at-home’’ and ‘‘Adven-
turous’’; McCrae & Costa, 1987).1 Before each subject
began rating stimuli, the experimenter made sure the
subject understood (1) the use of the Likert scales, (2)
that there is no necessary relationship between any two
of the scales (i.e., one could imagine somebody who was
outgoing but unfriendly, etc.), and (3) the definitions of
each anchor word. As with the emotional state words,
the Likert scales were available in front of the subject for
the duration of testing.
Movement Description Control Task
This task was designed to control for more basic impair-
ments in recognizing point-light walkers as human
movement stimuli. Subjects were asked to spontane-
ously generate a verb that described the movement
shown in each of nine stimuli, given ‘‘walking’’ as an
example. Note that the subject was not told that the
stimuli were people, and no further cues regarding
the nature of the stimuli were given at any point in the
testing process.
All subjects completed all three point-light walker
tasks, except one subject who was judged to give an
invalid performance on the personality task. This judg-
ment was made by the experimenter at the time of
testing, and these data were not entered or analyzed for
this subject.
Background Neuropsychological Measures
Subjects with brain damage were given background
neuropsychological and psychological tests to assess
intellectual ability, memory, visual perception, depres-
sion, and aphasia. Neurologically normal subjects were
given tests to assess intellectual ability to facilitate
matching with the brain-damaged subjects (Table 1).
Thus, all subjects were administered four subtests
(Similarities, Information, Comprehension, and Matrix
Reasoning) from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS-R or WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1991). Subjects with
brain damage were also given the Benton Facial Dis-
crimination Task (Benton et al., 1994), the Benton
Judgment of Line Orientation Task (Benton et al.,
1994); and the Benton Visual Retention Test (Benton
Sivan, 1992) to assess basic visuoperceptual abilities. To
assess depression, a clinical neuropsychologist blind to
subjects’ performance on the experimental tasks as-
signed ratings on a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (no
depression), 1 (mild depression), 2 (moderate depres-
sion), to 3 (severe depression). These ratings were
based on data from the Beck Depression Inventory
(Beck, 1987) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI or MMPI-2), Scale 2 (Butcher, Dahl-
strom, & Graham, 1989). Similarly, on the basis of the
Multilingual Aphasia Examination (Benton & Hamsher,
1989), the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination
(Goodglass & Kaplan, 1983), and on observations
recorded in the neuropsychological reports, a neuro-
psychologist blind to subjects’ performance on the
experimental tasks rated each subject on a scale from
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0 (normal) to 3 (severe impairment) in terms of
speech and language functioning. Scores thus repre-
sent summary measures of the overall degree of
speech/language impairment in each subject. The neu-
ropsychological tests of memory and visual perception
were administered only to the brain-damaged subjects
because the normal controls were presumed to be
normal in these functions. Similarly, the depression
and aphasia indices were obtained in brain-damaged
subjects but not in normal controls.
Data Processing and Analysis
Emotion Judgment
Emotion labels attributed by subjects with brain damage
were compared to those given by the NC reference group
in the following way: Each response was given credit
based on the proportion of subjects in the reference
group giving that response. For example, if a given
stimulus was called ‘‘happy’’ by 50% of the reference
group, ‘‘angry’’ by 40%, and ‘‘neutral’’ by 10%, then the
response ‘‘happy’’ would receive a score of 1.0 (.5/.5),
‘‘angry’’ would receive .8 (.4/.5), and ‘‘neutral’’ would
receive .2 (.1/.5). All other answers (in this example,
‘‘sad’’ and ‘‘afraid’’) would receive 0. This method ac-
cepted as normal a certain degree of variability in the
reference group responses. It is easy to imagine that a
stimulus can be recognized as both afraid and sad, for
example, and therefore a response that was not the
modal response could still be given partial credit.
For the correctness scores derived from the reference
NC group answers, higher numbers imply answers that
were chosen a large number of times by the NC refer-
ence group. We examined average correctness scores
across all stimuli and correctness scores for groups of
stimuli with the same modal response. We used the
entire NC group’s modal response to determine which
category a given stimulus was a member of (i.e., if the
majority of subjects in the entire NC group called a
movie ‘‘happy,’’ then it was considered a happy movie).
Thus, we examined both performance on emotion
recognition in general, and performance on the recog-
nition of individual emotions. See Table 2 for numbers
of stimuli in each emotion category and average NC
correctness ratings for these stimuli.
Personality Trait Judgment
Correctness scores were assigned to the personality
responses given by brain-damaged subjects and
matched NC subjects by taking the absolute value of
the z score relative to the reference group. This yields a
measure of distance away from the mean rating given
by the reference group that is irrespective of direction
of difference (e.g., z scores of 2.5 and +2.5 are both
2.5 away from the mean). Because the difference scores
obtained by this method are smaller for answers that
were closer to the NC mean, we inverted them by
subtracting from 2, yielding correctness scores in which
larger scores are reflective of answers more like normal
control answers. This inversion facilitates a comparison
with the emotion correctness score (in which higher
scores imply a large number of normal answers); how-
ever, in contrast to that score, answers of 1 are not
indicative of ceiling performance.
As stated above, all 41 stimuli were rated on all five
traits. However, pilot testing revealed that these stimuli
frequently failed to elicit reliable responses concerning
one or more traits; that is, they did not contain the
same amount of useful information about each trait. For
example, a slowly creeping point-light walker might be
reliably rated as untrustworthy but yield a wide range of
responses on the anxiety scale. Therefore, we examined
the variance in the responses given by the reference
group of normal subjects, and stimuli for which the SD
in responses for a given trait was greater than 1.0 were
Table 2. Number of Stimuli Included in Each Emotion
Category, as Well as Mean Correctness Scores for the Matched
NC Group for Each Category
Judgment
Category
Number of
Stimuli
Matched NC
Group Mean (SD)
Happy 11 .776 (.15)
Sad 7 .795 (.16)
Afraid 5 .725 (.14)
Angry 4 .571 (.23)
Neutral 6 .811 (.13)
Emotion mean 33 .754 (.05)
Table 3. Number of Stimuli Included in Each Personality
Trait Category, as Well as Mean Correctness Scores for the
Matched NC Group for Each Category
Judgment
Category
Number of
Stimuli
Matched NC Group
Mean (SD)
Outgoing/shy 36 1.11 (.15)
Friendly/unfriendly 32 1.05 (.19)
Trustworthy/not
trustworthy
41 1.10 (.29)
Calm/anxious 18 1.00 (.24)
Stay-at-home/
adventurous
38 1.13 (.19)
Personality mean (Weighted average) 1.09 (.16)
Note. The weighted average, which is used as the personality task
score, takes into account the number of stimuli included for each
category.
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eliminated for further analyses on that trait only (see
Table 3 for numbers of stimuli included in each trait
analysis and average difference scores for the matched
NC group on these stimuli).
Movement Labeling Task
Subjects’ descriptions of the locomotion of point-light
walkers (e.g., ‘‘walking,’’ ‘‘dancing,’’ ‘‘strolling,’’ ‘‘saun-
tering’’) were evaluated by four neurologically normal
adult coders who were blind to the identity of the
subjects. For each stimulus, the coders judged whether
a given answer was a good, mediocre, or inadequate/
incorrect description of the movement (e.g., walking
and strolling might both be good descriptions of a
walking point-light stimulus, strutting a mediocre de-
scription of the same stimulus, and skipping entirely
incorrect). These ratings were used to score each an-
swer, such that ratings of ‘‘good’’ scored 1 point, ratings
of ‘‘mediocre’’ scored .5 points, and incorrect descrip-
tions scored 0 points. The means of all four raters’
scores for each stimulus were then averaged across all
stimuli, yielding a correctness measure that reflected
how well subjects were able to recognize and label
basic locomotory patterns from point-light stimuli. For
this task, as for the two others, higher scores reflected
better answers.
Lesion Overlap Analysis
All lesion images were obtained by using the method
known as MAP-3 (Damasio, 2000), in which lesions from
individual subjects’ brains are manually transferred, slice
by slice, onto a common, normal, reference brain, creat-
ing a ‘‘lesion volume.’’ These volumes are then co-
rendered with the reference brain, allowing the visuali-
zation of the number of overlapping lesions at each
voxel. Lesion location for each individual subject was
determined by inspection of 3-D reconstructed MRI data.
We examined the lesion overlap of subjects who were
impaired on both the emotion and personality trait
judgment tasks (i.e., those who scored 2 SDs below
the matched NC mean). In addition, because we did not
‘‘sample’’ the brain uniformly (e.g., we have data from
few subjects with occipital lobe damage), we con-
structed normalized versions of these overlap images.
These normalized images were constructed by dividing
the lesion overlap of impaired subjects by the lesion
overlap of all 37 subjects, yielding images with warmer
colors representing areas in which a higher proportion
of subjects tested were impaired on a given task. Note
that we examined the overlap of impaired subjects only
for pixels where at least three subjects overlapped.
Without this stipulation, regions in which only one or
two subjects had a lesion would have appeared red if
either subject was impaired, indicating a high propor-
tion of subjects with damage in these areas were im-
paired on the task. Obviously, this would be misleading
if only one subject sampled had damage in a given
region. Because we observed the same regions of max-
imal overlap from the normalized pictures as from the
nonnormalized versions, we do not show the overlap
images for the normalization analysis.
A final overlap analysis examined whether the same
regions that were regions of maximal overlap across all
impaired subjects were also implicated in subjects who
were more impaired on one social task than the other.
To examine this, we selected the subset of brain-dam-
aged subjects more impaired on the emotion task than
on the personality task, and vice versa. Because an
impairment threshold of 2 SDs below the NC mean
would have yielded too few subjects for an informative
overlap image, we broadened our criterion for this anal-
ysis only. Thus, for the overlap image of subjects more
impaired on the emotion task than on the personality
task, we included those subjects who were 2 SDs below
the NC mean for the emotion task but < 2 SDs below
for the personality task, as well as those 1 SD below the
NC mean for the emotion task but < 1 SD below for the
personality task. The overlap image of subjects more
impaired on the personality task than on the emotion
task was constructed similarly.
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Notes
1. There are many theories about which trait dimensions
adequately describe personality variables. We chose the scales
here, adapted from McCrae and Costa’s ‘‘big five,’’ in part
because the number was similar to the number of basic
emotions we included, and in part because these trait dimen-
sions could be captured by using adjectives that are easily
understood by most of the individuals in our subject pools.
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